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Abstract
Our paper analyses the observed and desired labour supply by older workers and
(recent) retirees in a country (Italy) with limited opportunities for flexible work
schedules. To this purpose, we use a dataset drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey
on Household Income and Wealth providing information on desired and actual
working hours. Our empirical analysis documents the gap between older individuals’
desired and observed labour supply at both the extensive and the intensive margins
and traces it back to gender, education and family composition. The paper provides
useful insights into the potential usefulness of policies such as gradual retirement
and part-time work in increasing older workers’ employment.
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1 Introduction
Population ageing points to the need to increase the employment rate of older workers
in order to guarantee both the sustainability of pension systems and the adequacy of
resources in retirement. To achieve this goal, the main strategy of almost all European
countries has consisted of increases in the statutory retirement age, the tightening of
minimum requirements to access anticipated retirement and financial incentives to
continue to work beyond the minimum (Eurofound 2016; European Commission 2015;
OECD 2016). Although some countries (Italy among them) have established an auto-
matic link between longevity and retirement age, the compulsory extension of working
life is obviously not an ad libitum viable policy. This policy, moreover, reflects a rather
traditional retirement scenario, typically characterised by full-time work ending
abruptly in complete leisure. This pattern may not be what workers, or a significant
proportion of them, want and may not necessarily serve firms’ interests either. Con-
cerning the first, who are the focus of our study, harsh discontinuity between working
life and retirement, when the latter suddenly reduces working hours from full-time to
zero, can indeed be regarded as a welfare-decreasing factor. If rigidities in both the
pension system and the labour market prevent individuals from doing part-time work,
workers may feel constrained to retire earlier than they would have done. People may
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prefer retirement to full-time work, but they may be willing to continue to work if they
have access to a reduced effort level. Evidence on stated preferences for gradual retire-
ment in the USA, based on an internet survey in 2005, shows that 38% of respondents
aged 50 and over show interest in participating in partial retirement schemes (Brown
2005). Kantarci and van Soest (2008) present similar results for the Netherlands, where
about 55% of working men aged between 51 and 65 years stated an interest in working
part-time. Technological change, on its part, seems more favourable to flexibility than
traditional productive methods. Policy interventions designed to foster flexibility in
working schedules and to increase the possibility of combining a pension and work,
with some sort of gradual retirement, would then be welfare-improving, without curb-
ing firms’ profitability.
Given workers’ heterogeneity, investigating the characteristics of the people who
would be better off if they had access to a smoother scheme of retirement is the first
step in designing appropriate policies. In this paper, we look at preferences for hours of
work expressed by older individuals, whether in employment or already retired, and
compare them to their effective working hours (which may be zero in the case of full
retirement). The analysis gives us an estimate of the ‘discouraged’ labour supply that
older workers could instead deliver, as well as a picture of the characteristics of workers
willing to work longer. It also provides an empirical basis for measures at both govern-
ment and HR management levels directed at encouraging workers to postpone their re-
tirement instead of forcing them to work full-time.
The literature on the desired labour supply is limited, perhaps because of the short-
age of individual survey data eliciting this information. Some notable exceptions are
Callan et al. (2009), Euwals and van Soest (1999) and van Soest et al. (2002), who use
data on the preferred labour supply—respectively in Ireland and the Netherlands—to
estimate labour supply, wage elasticities and the impact of tax reforms. van Soest and
Vonkova (2014) exploit stated preferences collected by the Dutch CentER Panel about
different hypothetical retirement trajectories with different ages of (partial or full) re-
tirement and different replacement rates. They use the information to estimate parame-
ters of the utility function in order to simulate the sensitivity of retirement decisions to
financial incentives, showing substantial differences between results based on observed
or desired labour supply.
Our paper adds to the literature and to the policy debate by documenting the gap be-
tween the preferred and observed number of working hours, at both the extensive and
the intensive margins. To this end, we exploit an ad hoc section of the 2004 wave of
the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth to ascertain the desired labour
supply of both older workers and retirees. Our data testify to a ‘displacement effect’,
limiting older workers’ observed labour supply.
Descriptive evidence shows that a large majority of individuals aged 56–70 works the
desired number of hours (85% of the sample). A non-negligible fraction of retirees,
however, would like to work, most of them with a part-time schedule, and older
workers declare that they are willing to continue to work, albeit with a lower intensity.
The gap between the observed and desired labour supply is likely to depend on factors
affecting the disutility of labour and the utility of additional resources. Our results con-
firm that gender, education and family composition are relevant factors associated with
the desired labour supply. The comparison between the observed and the desired
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labour supply gives a measure of the severity of the displacement effect affecting older
workers with respect to their level of work.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of part-time jobs
and of rules for a more gradual retirement in Europe. Section 3 sketches the theoretical
framework and Section 4 describes the institutional framework. Section 5 illustrates the
data and the variables of interest. Section 6 comments on the empirical findings separ-
ately for retirees (Section 6.1) and for workers (Section 6.2). Section 7 concludes and
discusses some policy implications of our results.
2 Part-time work of older individuals and gradual retirement in Europe: an
overview
How much flexibility is there in Europe for working schedules at older ages? And
where does Italy stand within this context? With 14% of older workers (55–65) formally
engaged in part-time activities, Italy has the third lowest percentage of older
part-timers in the EU, after Greece and Spain. The number of part-timers differs widely
across countries, ranging from 7% in Greece to 49% in the Netherlands (Table 1). This
gap suggests that differences in preferences can hardly be the only explanatory variable
and that disincentives on the demand side as well as legal restrictions are likely to play
a significant role. Providing evidence of the ‘latent work supply’ of older individuals (i.e.
desired number of working hours in excess of the effective one) allows us to rule out
the unavailability of older workers to perform part-time work as the main cause of the
Italian discrepancy. A remarkable feature of European data is that where the overall in-
cidence of part-time jobs is higher, the percentage of older workers engaged in such
jobs is also higher. Conversely, where the incidence of part-time jobs is lower, this work
is concentrated among the younger age groups. A tentative interpretation, which is be-
yond the scope of the present analysis, is that the latter situation gives an indication of
precariousness, while the former suggests a better-performing labour market and more
efficient retirement rules (Devicienti et al. 2016). More specifically, in countries where
the market is more flexible and workers’ preferences can be accommodated, the supply
of part-time activities for older workers is higher than/equal to that of younger workers,
suggesting that generally older workers prefer to keep working but not in a full-time
capacity.
Part-time work at older ages can also be limited by legal restrictions to combine
labour income and the cashing in of pension benefits. In extreme cases (which was the
Table 1 Incidence of part-timers across European countries (percentage points)
IT FL SW NO DK GE NL UK FR ES PO GR EU 18
Age 55–64
Men 6.7 13.4 12.6 13.2 11.4 10.9 25.4 16.1 11.3 4.4 12.2 4.5 10.5
Women 24 18 35.9 41.6 34.8 51.9 81.1 48.9 34.7 20.2 17.7 11.6 38.7
Total 13.8 15.8 23.9 26.7 22.4 30.2 49.2 31.2 23.1 11.4 14.8 7.3 23.4
Age 15–64
Men 8.2 10.0 13 14.9 16.8 9.4 26.2 11.3 7.4 7.6 6.8 6.9 9.4
Women 32.7 20.2 35.6 38.0 36.9 46.5 76.4 40.8 29.8 24.1 12.1 13.7 36.2
Total 18.5 14.9 23.9 26 26.4 26.7 49.7 25.2 18.2 15.1 9.5 9.8 21.7
Source: Eurostat 2016
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situation in Italy as well as in other European countries), official work after (anticipated
or statutory) retirement age means a 100% taxation of pension benefits. In Italy, in par-
ticular, while the Defined Benefit formula to calculate the pension benefit effectively
provided incentives to early retirement, the impossibility to work on a regular basis en-
couraged moonlight activities by older workers. In recent years, measures directed at
supporting a more gradual retirement have often been advocated as a means to im-
prove social welfare (without necessarily reducing the overall efficiency) by allowing
workers to work (retire) more in accordance with their own preferences at older ages.
While gradual retirement on a large scale is still to come, various kinds of experiments
have been carried out, generally consisting of the possibility of combining the accrued
pension benefit (or a fraction of it) with work, either full- or part-time, and either with the
same firm (phased withdrawal) or through a ‘bridge job’ with a new employer (partial re-
tirement) (Brunello and Langella 2013; Kantarci and van Soest 2008). Various types of
gradual retirement have been introduced and tested in different European countries, al-
though the evidence regarding their success, in the sense of a consequent significant re-
duction of early withdrawals from labour matched by an increase in older workers’
employment rate, is quite modest (Delsen 1996). Highlighting the main reasons behind
this lack of popularity is beyond the scope of this paper. It may derive from inadequate de-
mand for part-time labour—indeed, a major issue in several European countries (Brunello
and Langella 2013; Kantarci and van Soest 2008)1—from inadequate labour supply by
older workers and/or from institutional constraints (pension and labour market regula-
tions). Our purpose here is to look at the discrepancy between the actual and the desired
labour supply for older workers as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of policies directed
at incentivising the employment rate of older people.
3 Conceptual background
A simple model provides the basic conceptual framework. Individuals are assumed to
face the following inter-temporal maximisation problem, where utility depends upon
consumption (c) and leisure (l) at each time from t till the end of life T, supposed
known.
maxct ;lt
XT
s¼t
u cs; lsð Þ ð1Þ
The value function Vt is then the inter-temporal utility at time t when optimal
choices are made:
Vt ¼ u ct ; lt
 
βu ctþ1; l

tþ1
 þ…þ β T−tð Þu cT ; lT
  ð2Þ
with β indicating the subjective time discounting factor. Leisure can have values be-
tween 0 (i.e. full-time work) and L, which corresponds to not working: 0 < l < L. In the
real world, leisure is not that flexible in its planning, as it is more likely that agents
have to choose between working full-time and not working, the part-time option rarely
being available. Let us focus our attention on the retirement period. After reaching the
minimum requirement for retirement (age or age plus seniority), the worker can choose
to withdraw and retire, or to engage in another year of (full-time) work. The trade-off
implies that one additional year at work translates into higher resources in terms of
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present remuneration and future pension benefits, but lower immediate leisure.2 Retire-
ment is assumed to be an irreversible choice. Workers will thus compare the two util-
ities under the two regimes. If the worker continues in (full-time) work after becoming
eligible for a pension, the intertemporal (time separable) utility she faces is the
following:
Vw ¼ u cwR ; 0
 þ βu cwRþ1; L
 
;…þ β T−Rð Þu cwT ; L
 
: ð3Þ
If she decides to retire, the intertemporal utility is:
Vr ¼ u crR; L
 þ βu crRþ1; L
 þ…þ β T−Rð Þu crT ; L
  ð4Þ
where Vw is the utility in case of an extra year of work and Vr is the utility in case of re-
tirement.3 L is full-time leisure after retirement, while leisure is set to 0 during working
life, since workers are constrained to work full-time (we abstract from unemployment
spells). Superscripts in consumption (ct
w and ct
r) denote consumption in the two states,
respectively, of employment and retirement. Consumption ct
w is higher than ct
r, reflect-
ing higher lifetime resources under the working regime compared to retirement. The
chosen option will be the one providing the maximum utility. The individual will thus
choose to postpone retirement if the following holds:
Vr > Vw ð5Þ
If a path of gradual retirement is offered, workers may choose this third option at
time R, with lwpt < L denoting partial leisure due to part-time work. In this case, they
get an indirect utility equal to:
Vwpt ¼ u cwptR ; lwptR
 þ βu cwptRþ1; L
 þ…β T−Rð Þ cwptT ; L
 
: ð6Þ
Gradual retirement would then be chosen if4:
Vwpt > Vr > Vw ð7Þ
Knowing the preferred number of hours of work, we are thus able to detect if, and to
what extent, there is room for more flexible working schedules which could improve
workers’ welfare. Our sample of interest is thus composed of people who are going to
retire or have (recently) retired but would have preferred to stay at work under flexible
working hours. Knowing the desired working hours and the actual working hours
makes our analysis feasible.
4 Institutional framework
The choice between protracting work and retiring depends on various economic and
institutional variables, shaping the environment in which the decision is taken and hav-
ing to do with regulations in both the labour market and the pension system. These in-
clude the pension formula, which characterises the economic pros and cons of the
decision and take into account the opportunities/constraints characterising the working
career. In the case of a Defined Contribution (DC) with actuarial adjustments, the con-
tinuation of work is not penalised and the worker can freely decide according to her
personal preferences, possibly mitigated by firm issues, on the one hand, and health
status plus family considerations, on the other (Coda Moscarola et al. 2016). When the
formula is, instead, of the Defined Benefit (DB) type, favouring steep earning profiles
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and partly independent of the total amount of paid contributions, the continuation
of work generates an implicit tax on the pension wealth, because the increase in
the pension benefit does not totally compensate for the additional contributions
and the loss of 1 year of pension benefits. This kind of disincentive can be enough
to induce workers to withdraw as soon as possible. Another important feature comes
from the possibility of combining work and pension. DB pensions are typically associated
with stricter limitations on work with respect to the DC ones. In the case of retirement as
a binary choice, the worker is either engaged full-time or is a full-time retiree. The DC
formula makes the combination of work and pension much easier, and in variable ways,
by reducing or canceling the penalty for continuing work.
Since our data concern Italy in year 2004, we briefly summarise the situation in
what follows. Retirement could be accessed at a relatively young age through
so-called seniority pensions, allowing workers to retire after a minimum of 35 years
of service, almost irrespective of age, on condition they do not continue to work (or
work part-time for the self-employed). With respect to paid contributions, benefits
were relatively generous, and this somewhat justified the no-earning condition for
an employee or the limit to the self-employed. Restrictions on earnings were im-
posed even in the case of the (very rare) DC pensions. No restriction was applied in
case of retirement at the statutory age (so-called old age pensions) or for seniority
longer than 40 years. This rather strict regime, usually motivated by the consider-
ation of encouraging the substitution of old workers with the young ones (the ‘lump
of labour fallacy’ at work) started to change in 2001 and was completed in 2009,
when the cashing in of the pension benefit and earning income from work were
made compatible.
5 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) and relies on data for the 2004wave. The SHIWdataset is a representative
sampleof the Italian residentpopulationandcovers about8000households in eachwave. It
collects detailed information on household composition, income, wealth and the labour
market status of thehouseholdmembers, including thenumber ofworkedweeks andaver-
age weekly working hours in the previous year. In addition, the 2004 wave includes ques-
tions to elicit the respondents’ desired labour supply: more precisely, all the employed
workers (employees, self-employed, members of a profession, family business, etc.) who
were interviewedinpersonwereaskedthe followingquestion:
At the same hourly earnings, how many hours would you like to work on average
per week?
Respondents who were not employed (unemployed, first job seekers, homemakers, re-
tirees, etc.) reported whether they would be willing to work; if they answered ‘yes’, they
were asked two additional questions: Considering the conditions generally obtainable
nowadays, if [name] worked, given age, education and experience, would [name] be
willing to accept: full-time payroll employment for the whole year/part-time payroll
employment for the whole year/only occasional, seasonal or informal payroll employ-
ment/only freelance work or self-employment?
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How many hours a week would [name] like to work in this hypothetical job?
We use this information to construct an indicator of desired participation in the labour
force (extensive margin) and to measure how many hours per week respondents would
like to work (intensive margin). While it is clearly stated that wages for the hypothetical
job are either current or market wages, the assumption that all other conditions (avail-
ability of child and elderly care, etc.) remain the same is implicit. In addition, nothing is
explicitly stated about the possibility of gradual retirement, namely the possibility of
combining part-time work with the cashing in of accrued pension benefits, nor about
the value of future pension entitlements under different working choices (more specif-
ically, whether the pension benefit will increase in accordance with an actuarially fair
mechanism, or in a way that does not compensate for the additional contributions and
the reduced retirement period, as implied by the then adopted DB formula). The as-
sumption underlying our analysis is that respondents refer to the then current pension
legislation which, as we have just seen, imposed restrictions on the possibility of com-
bining labour income and retirement benefits. For the purpose of our analysis, we re-
strict our sample to individuals close to retirement age, namely those aged 55–70.
Given that we want to focus on retirement choices as opposed to the continuation to
work, we select individuals who are either still working or retired; we exclude from the
sample those who are unemployed, homemakers and those on a different social insur-
ance scheme (disability/survivor’s/social pension). It is worth noting that while this
sample selection is not a major issue for male workers, because men in this age range
either work or are in a pre-retirement scheme or are retired, more caution is required
in the case of women, given their much lower participation rate (around 40%). After
excluding from the sample cases in which the dependent variable has a missing value,
we end up with 2670 observations, made up of 962 women and 1708 men. Figure 1
shows the distribution of workers and retirees by gender and age. In our sample, 77%
of men and 87% of women are retired.5 The incidence of retirees obviously increases
with age. This path is not linear, however, and we observe a sharp increase in the num-
ber of retired individuals around the typical retirement ages for private sector em-
ployees in 2004, which were 57 and 60 years, respectively, for women and men.
The regressors we use in our empirical analysis are factors that are likely to affect the
disutility of work and the utility of additional resources, along with tastes and different
attitudes towards participation in the labour market. We use as independent variables
age and educational dummies6, indicators for working (or having worked) as
self-employed or in the private sector, total net wealth, variables for family composition
(an indicator for being married or cohabiting with a partner; a dummy equal to one if
the partner, if any, is working; the number of children living in the same or in another
family) and two geographical indicators. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.7
6 Observed and desired labour supply
In this section, we document whether, and to what extent, the effective labour supply
differs from the desired one at the extensive and intensive margins. The possibility of
looking at desired hours versus actual hours of work is allowed by the unique feature
of our dataset where each respondent was asked the desired number of working hours.
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As anticipated in the introduction, the general picture reveals that approximately 85%
of the sample is satisfied with the actual time devoted to work.
We first illustrate the desired participation and working hours of retirees (Section
6.1). In Section 6.2, we focus on the subsample of older workers and analyse the extent
of the gap between their preferred and observed labour supply. To investigate whether
preferences among older and younger workers differ, we also illustrate the desired
labour supply for younger workers.
6.1 Retirees
A small but non-negligible fraction of retirees in our sample declares a willingness to
work: respectively 7% of men and 3% of women. In order to describe their characteris-
tics, we estimate the probability that retirees are willing to work. Probit estimate results
are reported in Table 3 for the whole sample (column 1). Since the determinants of
labour supply could be different across genders (Peri et al. 2015), we show the results
for subsamples of women and men in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
Confirming the descriptive statistics, retired men are, on average, 4 percentage points
more likely to be willing to work. Looking at the age distribution, we estimate a signifi-
cant reduction by 8 percentage points in the willingness to work after the age of 65 for
men, while we do not find any significant path for women. The desired participation of
retirees turns out to be correlated with education. Men with a degree are 4.7 percent-
age points more likely to be willing to work, possibly reflecting a less physically de-
manding activity, higher attachment to the job and a substitution effect driven by
higher wages (compared to less educated men). For women, the data point to a
U-shaped effect of education: the desired participation is lowest for women with a high
Fig. 1 Distribution of working and retired respondents, by age. Notes: 2670 observations (962 women and
1708 men)
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school degree and highest for those with a college degree. The desired participation of
more highly educated women could reflect, along with the effect of high-paid and less
physically intensive jobs, different family models and attitudes to work. Lower resources
and pension benefits (linked to lower past wages) could explain the higher desired par-
ticipation of less educated women compared to those with a secondary school educa-
tion, by 1.5 percentage points. We estimate a positive coefficient for self-employment,
while working in the public or private sector turns out to be insignificantly correlated
with desired participation. We do not detect a significant effect of household wealth,
while family composition plays a role. Married retired women are less likely to be will-
ing to work than their single counterparts, possibly because they can rely on family re-
sources (including survivors' benefits) to support consumption during retirement or
because they are more involved in household chores. Looking at men, we do not find a
significant difference between single and married men, though the latter turn out to be
more prone to work if their partner is working. This finding is in line with the literature
on joint retirement decisions, which shows that partners are likely to retire together
(Banks et al. 2010), albeit the majority do not spend more time together, but rather syn-
chronise their leisure (Stancanelli and van Soest 2012). Finally, we estimate that the
number of children increases the desired participation of male workers. This result is
consistent with the intention to leave a bequest or to help grown children through inter
vivos transfers (Stark and Nicinska 2015), which are both common in Italy, where 80%
of individuals inherit or receive a house (or part of it). A further step to illustrate the
desired labour supply of retirees is the analysis of the optimal intensity in their labour
supply. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the preferred number of working hours
that retirees are willing to offer.8 A large fraction of them would work less than the
full-time schedule, with a mode of almost 30% of retirees reporting 20–24 h per week
(which is more than half the normal standard of 36). More than 25% would prefer to
work less than 20 h, while more than 70% would supply up to 30 h per week.
To illustrate which factors are associated with a greater desired intensity in the re-
tirees’ labour supply, we perform two complementary exercises. Firstly, we exploit in-
formation on the desired type of job and we estimate a multinomial logit model
(Table 4); secondly, we use a Tobit model to estimate the number of working hours
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Age 61–65 0.339 0.474
Age 66–70 0.33 0.47
Medium educ. 0.243 0.429
High educ. 0.273 0.446
Self-employed 0.17 0.375
Private sector 0.728 0.445
Net wealth 0.147 0.175
Married/cohab. 0.817 0.387
No. children (in/out) 1.83 1.238
South 0.252 0.434
Center 0.249 0.432
Notes: 2670 observations
Trucchi et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy            (2018) 7:10 Page 9 of 19
desired by retirees (Table 5). Table 4 reports estimate results for a multinomial logit
model, estimated on the sample of retirees who are willing to work. Potential outcomes
for the desired job are working full-time, working part-time, working occasionally, and
Table 3 Desired participation (probit), retired
All Women Men
Male 0.544***
(0.101)
[0.043]
Age 61–65 − 0.067 0.385 − 0.173
(0.107) (0.282) (0.124)
[− 0.006] [0.014] [− 0.019]
Age 66–70 − 0.712*** − 0.468 − 0.731***
(0.132) (0.357) (0.145)
[− 0.056] [− 0.015] [−0.078]
Medium educ. − 0.090 − 0.659** 0.060
(0.150) (0.296) (0.177)
[− 0.007] [− 0.015] [0.007]
High educ. 0.438*** 0.812*** 0.349*
(0.159) (0.296) (0.185)
[0.046] [0.047] [0.047]
Self-employed 0.281** 0.452 0.286*
(0.134) (0.289) (0.153)
[0.029] [0.022] [0.039]
Private sector − 0.033 − 0.183 − 0.003
(0.116) (0.251) (0.135)
[− 0.003] [− 0.007] [−0 .000]
Net wealth − 0.006 − 0.506 0.200
(0.266) (0.679) (0.266)
[− 0.001] [− 0.017] [0.023]
Married/cohab. − 0.514*** − 0.933*** − 0.213
(0.122) (0.193) (0.181)
[− 0.059] [− 0.056] [− 0.028]
No. children (in/out) 0.106*** 0.074 0.107***
(0.034) (0.074) (0.039)
[0.009] [0.003] [0.012]
South − 0.017 − 0.739** 0.130
(0.118) (0.304) (0.135)
[− 0.001] [− 0.016] [0.016]
Center 0.180 − 0.059 0.273**
(0.111) (0.227) (0.132)
[0.017] [− 0.002] [0.035]
Constant − 1.681*** − 1.398*** − 1.489***
(0.198) (0.366) (0.236)
Notes: Observations: 2142 (834 women and 1308 men). The table shows the estimated coefficients; standard errors are in
round brackets and marginal effects in squared brackets; other variables are at their mean value
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Fig. 2 Distribution of desired intensity for retirees who would like to work. Notes: 81 observations
Table 4 Type of job, retirees willing to work. Multinomial logit
Full-time Part-time Occasional Self-empl.
Male 0.010 − 0.228 0.185 0.033
(0.057) (0.126)* (0.134) (0.104)
Age 61–65 0.031 − 0.050 0.089 − 0.070
(0.048) (0.096) (0.101) (0.084)
Age 66–70 − 0.681*** 0.324** 0.357** 0.000
(0.248) (0.147) (0.161) (0.151)
Medium educ. 0.037 0.368*** − 0.169 − 0.236**
(0.041) (0.105) (0.124) (0.095)
High educ. 0.004 − 0.344*** 0.025 0.316***
(0.032) (0.129) (0.138) (0.118)
Self-employed 0.007 − 0.147 − 0.293** 0.433***
(0.056) (0.139) (0.140) (0.101)
Private sector 0.052 − 0.061 − 0.021 0.030
(0.073) (0.093) (0.102) (0.088)
Net wealth − 0.185 − 0.264 0.147 0.302
(0.296) (0.301) (0.282) (0.197)
Married/cohab. − 0.008 0.008 − 0.156 0.157
(0.064) (0.160) (0.136) (0.135)
No. children (in/out) 0.001 − 0.002 0.010 − 0.009
(0.015) (0.046) (0.043) (0.051)
South 0.028 0.114 − 0.025 − 0.116
(0.056) (0.107) (0.111) (0.107)
Center 0.019 − 0.119 0.122 − 0.022
(0.063) (0.101) (0.096) (0.084)
Notes: Observations: 120
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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self-employment/freelance only. Older retirees (aged 66–70) are less prone to work
full-time and prefer part-time or occasional jobs. Education level is correlated with the
probability of being self-employed, as opposed to part-time jobs. Those with a high and
low level of education are, respectively, the most and least likely to choose
self-employment. This is possibly correlated with different types of jobs within the
broad category of self-employment, more likely related to consultancy or professional
advice for people with a degree, and to manual jobs for respondents with a low level of
schooling. Finally, people who were self-employed declared that they preferred to re-
main in this type of employment. Table 5, based on Tobit estimate results, shows the
effect of covariates on desired intensity, given that the desired number of working
hours is positive. As expected, retirees older than 65 would work 5 h fewer than youn-
ger respondents, this relationship being significant only for men. Highly educated
women would like to work more, possibly because of different types of jobs and their
attachment to the labour force. Family composition affects the intensity of the labour
supply, mirroring its impact on the extensive margin. Married women would work, on
average, 3 h per week fewer than single women, while having children increases the
labour supply of retired men. Finally, household wealth has a negative effect on desired
Table 5 Desired working hours (Tobit), retired
Women Men
Male 3.242***
(0.846)
Age 61–65 − 0.731 1.508 − 1.668
(0.889) (0.982) − 1.053
Age 66–70 − 5.210*** − 1.621 − 0.516***
(1.239) − 1.728 (1.388)
Medium educ. 0.569 − 1.797 1.549
− 1.170 − 1.233 − 1.342
High educ. 2.473* 3.403** 1.843
(1.272) (1.412) − 1.451
Self-employed 3.326*** 2.645** 3.432***
(1.126) (1.284) (1.154)
Private sector − 0.344 − 0.076 − 0.536
(0.973) − 1.184 − 1.110
Net wealth − 0.618 − 6.881** 2.324
− 2.426 (3.143) − 2.082
Married/cohab. − 2.760*** − 3.158*** − 0.016
(0.974) (0.685) − 1.632
No. children 0.754*** 0.370 0.728**
(0.267) (0.334) (0.314)
South − 0.162 − 23.496*** 1.317
(0.982) (4.898) − 1.086
Center 0.510 − 0.265 0.934
(0.962) (0.917) − 1.115
Notes: Observations: 2103 (827 women and 1276 men). Dummies for macro-areas are also included. The table shows the
marginal effects on E(dh|dh > 0), where dh is the number of desired hours. Other variables are at their mean value
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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intensity in the female labour supply, which is in line with recent literature showing a
positive impact of wealth on the labour supply (Brown et al. 2010; Cesarini et al. 2015;
Picchio et al. 2017).
6.2 Workers
We now turn to the description of the desired labour supply of respondents who are
still in the labour force. The distribution of observed and desired working hours is
shown in Fig. 3. On average, older workers work 40 h per week, while they would like
to offer fewer than 37 h. The weekly working hours are 40 or more hours for almost
60% of these workers, while fewer than 50% would like such an intensity; the gap be-
tween observed and desired hours is even larger if we consider a working schedule of
at least 45 h per week, the percentages being, respectively, 27 and 15%. About 40%
would work only a few hours less than the full-time schedule (30–39 h), and 6.5%
would work part-time (20–24 h). The differences between observed and desired work-
ing hours, for the whole sample and by gender, are shown, respectively, in Figs. 4 and
5. Positive values in those graphs reflect situations where the respondent works more
hours than s/he would like to. About half of the workers are satisfied; almost 40% work
more than their optimal level, and for half of them, the gap between observed and de-
sired intensity in the labour supply is larger than 10 h per week. Finally, we estimate
the extent to which desired working hours vary according to household and individual
characteristics. Table 6 reports OLS estimates, where the dependent variable is the de-
sired intensity of workers’ labour supply.9
We use two samples (55–70 and 50–70, respectively) for the whole population and
for men only. Men want to work more than women, a little more than 1.5 h. However,
the extra hour worked causes an extra burden for just a little more than half an hour.
Indeed only 0.4 h is desired for one extra hour of work observed for the older sample
Fig. 3 Distribution of observed and desired hours for workers. Notes: 527 observations
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(55–70). When we include those aged between 50 and 55, we notice that people dislike
less the extra hour worked (0.5 being the coefficient of observed hours versus 0.4 for
the older sample in column 1). Focusing on men only, we notice that in some cases the
male sample shows a more pronounced effect of significant coefficients such as being
married. Married men would like to work two additional hours, highlighting the
possible household head effect and family supporting role. The number of desired
working hours turns out to be greater for less educated workers, private sector
employees, married respondents and those living in northern regions.
Finally, we compare our results for workers around retirement with those for younger
workers. Estimate results for the sample of workers aged 30–50 years are reported in
Table 7. The general picture holds across differently aged workers. Young men who
work would like, on average, to work additional 2 h. However, the extra hour actually
worked causes a heavier burden for the younger than for the older workers, the coeffi-
cient of the observed hours indicating that for each hour worked, less than half an hour
would be the preferred time devoted to work (0.4 of an hour). When the sample is split
by gender, men clearly show the highest burden of working ‘too much’ in relation to
their optimal (desired) hours, which are a third of those actually worked.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the observed and desired labour supply of Italian people close (on
both sides) to retirement age and identifies the individuals who suffer a larger discrep-
ancy of their effective labour supply in comparison to its preferred level. Our analysis
shows that a somewhat relevant proportion of retirees (3% and 7% for women and
men, respectively) would be willing to work. We distinguished between workers and re-
tirees. As for the latter group, men are, on average, more willing to work than women.
A college degree is associated with a higher desired labour supply, both at the extensive
and at the intensive margins. Further, family composition affects the desired retirees’
labour supply, but differently for men and women and according to marital status.
Fig. 4 Distribution of difference between observed and desired hours for workers. Notes: 527 observations
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Married women would like to work less than those who are single, while men’s
favourite participation in the labour market turns out to be higher when their wife is
still working, in line with the complementarity hypothesis in the retirement decision of
couples. Finally, retired men with children are more willing to work than men without
offspring.
Turning to (older) workers, their favourite labour supply is, on average, smaller than
the actual hours worked, indicating a preference for reduced labour activity. This result
is consistent with a more general sentiment of lower desired hours of work, which
emerges also for younger workers. Indeed, preference for working less hours dominates
at any age among workers.
The evident discrepancy between the observed and desired labour supply suggests that
labour and retirement policies do not accommodate the preferred working pattern of older
individuals. However, while promoting flexibility in working trajectories at the end of the
working life can improve the welfare of workers whose labour supply is constrained to be
zero at retirement, the overall effect on the total working hours is less straightforward. Some
workers who indicated a preference for part-time work would otherwise have retired com-
pletely, but others would have kept working full-time, the total effect on the labour supply
depending on which of the two effects dominates. However, as pointed out by Kantarci and
van Soest (2008), ‘previous studies that make the quantitative trade-off of the negative and
positive labour supply effects unambiguously conclude that the positive effects dominate: cre-
ating more opportunities for gradual retirement can lead to an increase in total labour sup-
ply’. Along with an impact on the labour force participation of the older population,
promoting flexibility in exiting the labour market has other effects. Firstly, it can increase job
satisfaction and utility of workers at the end of their career by allowing them to work at an
intensity that is closer to their preferred one. Secondly, gradual retirement schemes could
Fig. 5 Distribution of difference between observed and desired hours for workers. Notes: 527 observations:
128 women and 399 men
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prevent the use of alternative routes to exit the labour market, such as disability pensions or
unemployment/redundancy schemes (like the so-called Cassa Integrazione Guadagni), which
are costly and affect either the public or the private budget and still are, notwithstanding
changes and reforms, particularly relevant in the Italian context.
It must be acknowledged that flexibility in the working schedule generally comes at a
cost for employers, particularly where older workers are concerned, which could ex-
plain why gradual retirement and part-time jobs for older workers are less developed
than looking just at the individuals’ labour supply would imply. This issue goes beyond
Table 6 Desired working hours, workers
Age 55–70 Age 50–70
All Men All Men
Male 1.589** 1.680***
(0.775) (0.454)
Hours worked 0.434*** 0.438*** 0.490*** 0.446***
(0.044) (0.056) (0.031) (0.040)
Wage − 0.018 − 0.043 − 0.013 − 0.027
(0.047) (0.047) (0.029) (0.030)
Age 56–60 0.674 0.589
(0.435) (0.499)
Age 61–65 − 0.018 0.405 0.374 0.871
(0.643) (0.770) (0.633) (0.742)
Age 66–70 − 0.205 − 0.853 0.468 − 0.395
(1.460) (1.751) (1.328) (1.613)
Medium educ. 1.273 0.360 1.266** 0.719
(0.818) (0.973) (0.526) (0.608)
High educ. − 1.544* − 0.712 − 1.480*** − 0.780
(0.867) (1.023) (0.571) (0.656)
Self-employed − 0.310 − 0.648 − 0.534 − 0.647
(0.784) (0.844) (0.543) (0.612)
Private sector 1.536** 1.914** 1.329*** 1.449***
(0.700) (0.776) (0.410) (0.471)
Net wealth 1.289 2.410* 0.224 0.588
(1.359) (1.424) (1.037) (1.250)
Married/cohab. 1.747** 2.150** 0.554 1.175*
(0.734) (0.895) (0.468) (0.639)
No. children (in/out) 0.136 0.165 0.046 0.060
(0.231) (0.251) (0.117) (0.135)
South − 1.747** − 2.271*** − 0.497 − 0.737
(0.761) (0.826) (0.462) (0.530)
Center − 1.484** − 1.448* − 0.349 − 0.050
(0.690) (0.755) (0.446) (0.514)
Constant 17.364*** 18.371*** 15.156*** 17.967***
(1.752) (2.331) (1.102) (1.620)
Notes: Observations: 527 aged 55–70 (399 men); 1186 aged 50–70 (848 men). Estimated coefficients are reported.
Standard errors (in round brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Dependent variable: desired working hours
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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the scope of our analysis; it is extensively discussed in Kantarci and van Soest (2008)
and represents an interesting topic for future research.
Endnotes
1Female labour supply, in particular, whose dynamic is strongly affected by fertility
decisions and caring responsibilities (Battistin et al. 2015; Bratti et al. 2018), might be
more responsive to a smoother decline in working hours to retirement.
Table 7 Desired working hours, workers aged 31–50
All Women Men
Male 2.423***
(0.288)
Hours worked 0.416*** 0.481*** 0.341***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.032)
Wage 0.029 − 0.032 0.033
(0.027) (0.062) (0.028)
Age 36–40 0.223 1.117* − 0.655
(0.388) (0.605) (0.495)
Age 41–45 0.837** 1.268** 0.125
(0.383) (0.557) (0.518)
Age 46–50 0.201 0.568 − 0.551
(0.378) (0.577) (0.498)
Medium educ. 0.534* 0.194 0.828**
(0.316) (0.512) (0.383)
High educ. − 1.239*** − 1.002* − 1.382***
(0.332) (0.540) (0.406)
Self-employed 0.173 − 0.163 0.732
(0.390) (0.628) (0.499)
Private sector 0.885*** 0.531 1.105***
(0.306) (0.448) (0.417)
Net wealth 0.497 0.192 1.011
(1.164) (1.044) (1.828)
Married/cohab. − 1.306*** − 1.159 − 0.676
(0.454) (0.943) (0.605)
No. children 0.017 − 0.145 0.164
(0.094) (0.143) (0.118)
Working partner 0.347 − 0.214 0.541
(0.348) (0.880) (0.389)
South − 0.052 0.585 − 0.480
(0.340) (0.527) (0.430)
Center − 0.085 − 0.103 0.022
(0.299) (0.464) (0.378)
Constant 18.608*** 17.187*** 23.581***
(0.897) (1.441) (1.367)
Notes: Observations: 2612 (1053 women and 1559 men). Estimated coefficients are reported. Standard errors (in round
brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Dependent variable: desired work
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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2For simplicity, we do not model directly DB pension formulas which are not actuari-
ally fair and imply that increases in the pension benefit do not compensate the forgone
year of retirement and the additional year of contributions (Castellino and Fornero
2001). Their implicit taxation of pension wealth in consequence of postponement of
retirement can be thought of in terms of ‘unobservable’ affecting the utility of working.
3We assume here that everyone retires in the next period (R + 1). This simplifying
assumption does not alter the main message of our stylized framework.
4If, instead, Vwpt > Vw > Vr, workers may decide to switch from a full-time to a
part-time working schedule.
5The sample consists of 2142 retirees and 528 workers.
6Medium-level education captures respondents with a high school diploma; highly
educated respondents are those with a degree or more. The reference category is
low-level education (compulsory schooling).
7One of the variables that could potentially explain less desire for work is health sta-
tus, which is, however, not present in this wave of the SHIW.
8The reduced number of retirees who would like to work and indicate their desired
intensity suggests some caution is required in the interpretation of these results.
9Sample size issues do not allow this equation to be estimated by gender.
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